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Abstract:  
 
This article proceeds to a normative claim that the potential of the European Citizens’ Initiative 
(ECI) – an instrument expected to increase democratic legitimacy in the EU –  should be evaluated in 
the light of the post-Lisbon Community method and not as an additional ‘opportunity structure for 
citizens’ participation’. The first section explains why the Community method is primarily a 
mechanism of ‘output legitimacy’, even after the Lisbon Treaty. Furthermore, the legal framework of 
the ECI (notably the Regulation 211/2011 but also the Commission’s Green Paper preceding the 
adoption of the Regulation) is provided. The evaluation section concludes that the ECI’s legislative 
framework, far from an instrument of direct democracy, perhaps an additional ‘opportunity structure’, 
cannot affect the Community method nor seriously increase democratic legitimacy at the EU level due 
to the – simultaneous – presence of two thresholds: the intactness of the Commission’s legislative 
monopoly and the burdensome formalities imposed upon citizens and organisers. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION: WHY THE ECI SHOULD BE SEEN ALONGSIDE THE 
STATUS OF THE POST-LISBON COMMUNITY METHOD 
 
When the Lisbon Treaty entered into force on December 1st, 2009, the students of the 
European Union were particularly interested in the potential of the long promised, 
discussed and publicized ‘European Citizens’ Initiative’ (ECI), ie the possibility of one 
million citizens to contact the Commission in order to initiate the decision-making process. 
Would it mark a new democratic chapter in the life of the EU’s decision-making or would it 
be a symbolic declaration of faith in the citizens of Europe? 
 
This article suggests that the potential of the ECI should be evaluated in relation to its 
possible impact on the post-Lisbon Community method and not as an addition to the 
existing ‘opportunity structures for citizens’ participation’.1 Two principal reasons could be 
identified. First, undeniably the purpose of the ECI is to produce legislation and this can be 
confirmed by a series of provisions.2 The European Parliament referred to the citizens’ 
initiative as ‘a means of exercising public sovereign power in the area of legislation’.3 This is 
clearly stated in the Commission’s online interactive guide, ‘If the Commission decides to 
follow your initiative [...] the legislative procedure starts’.4 Therefore its purpose is to 
directly affect the Union’s decision-making processes, where the Community method’s 
presence has admittedly become dominant. Second, and equally important, it appears that 
the EU institutions (and in particular the Commission) have recognized the need of the 
Community method to follow a different path. In the well known White Paper on European 
Governance,5 there were explicit references to the shortcomings of the Community method, 
which should take in the future a ‘less top-down approach’, characterized by openness, 
clarity and interaction with the regional level, in order to help reduce the state of alienation 
between the citizens and the Union’s work and eventually meet their expectations.6 
Similarly, in a Communication on the future of the Community method, the shortcomings of 
the latter were summarized by the Commission as follows, ‘It [the Community method] has 
proved its effectiveness and must preserve it. It must gain in terms of democratic legitimacy. 
Future reforms of the treaties will therefore need to look at renewing the Community method’.7 
Third, and related to the above, it is suggested that an instrument designed primarily to 
involve citizens in decision-making will increase democratic legitimacy only if it is going to 
contribute to nothing less but exactly this; affect decision-making and in particular the 
Community method. I return to this point in the penultimate section of this contribution. 
 
                                                          
1 See Michael Nentwich, ‘Opportunity Structures for Citizens’ Participation: The Case of the European Union’ 
in Albert Weale and Michael Nentwich (eds), Political Theory and the European Union: Legitimacy, Constitutional 
Choice and Citizenship (Routledge 1998) 125 – 140. 
2 As art 11.4 TEU verifies, but also art 4.2(b) of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on the citizens’ initiative [2011] OJ L 65/1 (Regulation). Besides, as 
will be seen below, the organisers of the ECI should specify the Treaty provisions that enable the Commission 
to act, whereas they may optionally submit a draft legal act to the Commission. 
3 European Parliament Resolution of 7 May 2009 requesting the Commission to submit a proposal for a 
regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the implementation of the citizens’ initiative 
[2009] (Resolution). 
4 <ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/how-it-works/answer?lg=en> accessed 11 January 2013. 
5 Commission of the European Communities, ‘European Governance: A White Paper’ [2001] COM 428 
(White Paper) 
6 ibid 4 and 7. 
7 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Communication on the Future of the European Union – 
European Governance: Renewing the Community Method’, [2001] COM 727 final, 8 (emphasis in the 
original). 
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A discussion on the EU’s insufficient democratic legitimacy and its nature exceeds the 
purposes of this study.8 One thing is certain, the debate is far from outdated, not only in 
scholarly terms9 but also in discourses by national and EU leaders in the context of the 
current crisis.10 For present purposes, if we accept first, that the Union’s decision-making, 
placing centrally the Community method, is still widely based on ‘output’ legitimacy 
mechanisms (efficiency) rather than ‘input’ mechanisms (processes)11 and second, putting 
aside scholarly accounts, that the Union’s institutions and in particular the Commission has 
highlighted – as shown above    the need for a less top-down approach with a view to 
involving the citizens and thus gain in democratic legitimacy, then it is pivotal to examine 
to what extent the citizens’ initiative strengthens the input side of democracy at Union 
level. 
 
Given that the contribution this article aims at making resides in the possible impact of the 
ECI upon the Community method, it is opportune to delimitate from the start the two ways 
in which this could take place. On the one hand, the ECI could penetrate to the Community 
method    from a pragmatic perspective    by affecting the agenda-setting monopoly of the 
Commission. On the other hand and in a broader context, a flexible initiative that would 
prioritize the involvement of the European citizens without imposing unnecessary 
thresholds could add to the overall improvement of the democratic character of the EU 
process of decision-making. Thus, before any assessment, it is crucial to present the main 
features of the Community method with a view to demonstrating how the method is a 
mechanism of primarily output legitimacy (see next section). This section will be followed 
by the provisions on the ECI, focusing on the Treaties, the Commission’s Green Paper and 
the Regulation 211/2011. The final section will attempt to answer the research question of 
the article, namely whether the ECI could offer any alternatives to the current framework of 
a largely output-oriented Community method. 
 
2. THE COMMUNITY METHOD AS A MECHANISM OF (PRIMARILY) OUTPUT 
LEGITIMACY 
 
The Community method has been the cornerstone of the production of transnational law of 
a multilevel polity, the EU. An extensive exposition of its features appears unnecessary.12 
The focus of this contribution will therefore shift to the demonstration of its output-
oriented character. As a preliminary remark, nonetheless, one may distinguish between the 
Community method stricto sensu and the Community method lato sensu. The latter could be 
defined as follows: beyond the minimum version of decision-making presented in the White 
Paper, there is a whole cycle of preparation for the Commission before the actual activation 
                                                          
8 But see a comprehensive overview in Beate Kohler-Koch and Berthold Rittberger (eds), Debating the 
Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union (Rowman and Littlefield, 2007). Furthermore, as Philippe 
Schmitter wisely put it, legitimacy is ‘invoke[d] [...] when it is missing or deficient’. See Philippe C Schmitter, 
‘Can the European Union be Legitimised by Governance?’ (2007) 1 EJLS 1. 
9 Compare for instance the recently published paper by Schmidt, where she inserts the notion of ‘throughput 
legitimacy’, in other words ‘governance with the people’: Vivien Schmidt, ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the 
European Union Revisited: Input, Output and “Throughput”’ [2012] Political Studies 1-21 and references 
cited therein. 
10 Giovanni Moro (ed), The Single Currency and European Citizenship: Unveiling the Other Side of the Coin 
(Continuum 2013, forthcoming). 
11 Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (OUP 1999). 
12 One might wish to consult the White Paper, 8; Giandomenico Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration: The 
Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth (OUP 2005) and recently Renaud Dehousse (ed), The Community 
Method: Obstinate or Obsolete? (Palgrave Macmillan 2011). 
 VOLUME 6 EJLS    ISSUE 1 
 
94 
 
of its initiative right, which runs from ‘agenda-setting’ to ‘policy formulation’ (the 
discussion of the alternatives) and vice versa.13 
 
The Commission claimed that the Community method stricto sensu respects representative 
democracy, because the European Parliament represents the citizens of the Union, while the 
Council represents the member states.14 As Lord has shown, however, the so-called ‘dual 
representation’ is to a certain extent utopian, given that the elections for the European 
Parliament are considered as second-order, with very limited campaigns and debates on 
European issues,15 whereas it would be rather difficult to prove that national voters, when 
electing their governments, take into account to a considerable degree the performance or 
the agendas of their candidate-ministers in the Council.  
 
More importantly, however, the Commission, along with scholarship, understands that the 
Community method widely favours efficiency, trying ‘to arbitrate between different 
interests’.16 This is in line with the classic Majone view, that the EU is a ‘regulatory model’ 
sacrificing democracy for ‘efficiency-oriented policies’ which, at the end of the day, leave no 
member state on the losing side and therefore, only popular support for a federal idea can 
fulfil the call for a truly democratic EU.17 In this context, as will be further demonstrated 
below, the Commission proposes bills that are likely to be accepted at the levels of the 
European Parliament and the Council. At the Council, the practice of ‘issue linkage’ among 
member states – with the assistance of Coreper - facilitates the consensual spirit of decisions 
and the resolution of conflicts.18 As Dehousse observes, ‘an ideological commitment to 
European integration’ is not imperative; even if member states adopt ‘a pure strategy of self-
interest’, they still ‘could [...] support (limited) transfers of sovereignty to improve the 
efficiency of international policy-making’.19 Therefore, an outcome (output) that will leave 
most actors satisfied is the priority. Why efficiency, then? 
 
Historically, the Community method has been, to a large extent, an evolution of the Monnet 
method without producing the overall spill over effect that Monnet and other fathers of 
European integration had predicted.20 According to Majone, supranational independent 
institutions, producing legally-binding decisions and bigger in competences in relation to 
international organizations known at that time, were particularly relevant in terms of 
integrating highly regulatory national markets and preserving the initial separation 
between politics and economics.21 The institutions largely play on a non-majoritarian basis, 
ignoring the government/opposition dimension and thus ‘the prime theme of the internal 
                                                          
13 Alasdair R Young, ‘The European Policy Process in Comparative Perspective’ in Helen Wallace, Mark A 
Pollack  and Alasdair R Young (eds), Policy-making in the European Union (OUP 2010) 52-55. 
14 White Paper 8. 
15 Christopher Lord, ‘Democracy and the European Union: Matching Means to Standards’ (2006) 13 
Democratization 668 – 684. See further Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt, ‘Nine Second-Order National 
Elections - A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Elections Results’ (1980) 8 Eur J Political 
Research (1980) 3-44. 
16 White Paper 8. 
17 Giandomenico Majone, ‘Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of Standards’ (1998) 4 ELJ 5-28. 
18 Thomas König and Dirk Junge ‘Conflict Resolution in the Council by Linkage of Commission Proposals’ in 
Renaud Dehousse (ed) The Community Method: Obstinate or Obsolete? (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 76-88. 
19 Renaud Dehousse, ‘Conclusion: Obstinate or Obsolete?’ in Dehousse (ed) (n 12) 201. 
20 Brigid Laffan and Sonia Mazey, ‘European Integration: The European Union – Reaching an Equilibrium?’ in 
Jeremy Richardson (ed) European Union: Power and Policy-Making (Routledge 2006) 32-54. 
21 Majone (n 12) 33-36 and 43-44. 
 VOLUME 6 EJLS    ISSUE 1 
 
95 
 
political process is the contest among autonomous institutions over the extent and security 
of their respective jurisdictional prerogatives’.22 
 
In parallel, the Community method has not been static and concrete over the years. As the 
integration process was evolving, it has been subject to the shift of dynamics among 
institutions and member states. For instance, the establishment of Coreper and the highly 
debated comitology phenomenon have had an undeniable overall impact on the 
Commission’s independence/defence of the European interest.23 What is more, beyond its 
classic cases establishing direct effect and supremacy, the CJEU has admittedly  yet 
indirectly   co-shaped co-decision. A notable example is Les Verts24 concerning the locus 
standi of the European Parliament, the latter coming out stronger in every Treaty reform 
from Maastricht onwards.25 Furthermore, recent research demonstrates that the 
Commission is losing significantly vis-à-vis its legislative monopoly to the benefit of the 
European Council and the Council.26 
 
Accordingly, the Commission being a ‘policy initiator’ implies that it has the final word as 
regards the proposal (or not) of legislation, but this doesn’t mean that it is unexposed to 
considerable pressures. As previously shown, the European Council’s guidelines certainly 
affect the Commission’s policy, and the same applies to the other two actors, the European 
Parliament and the Council (or its rotating Presidency), let alone the numerous pressure 
groups that deliberate with the Commission.27 This phase, which is described here as the 
Community method lato sensu, may involve contacts with interest groups, ‘expert’ and 
‘consultative committees’, invitations/political pressures from other EU institutions to 
legislate, publication of White and Green papers and respective feedback, and context-
evaluation by the Commission.28 In sum, a privileged networking that enables the 
Commission to figure out which policy proposal is likely to be accepted by the Council and 
the European Parliament and which one is likely to be rejected.29 Therefore, the 
Commission does not propose ex nihilo, and certainly, this pivotal practice further increases 
the chances of effectiveness, or output legitimacy. And it is unquestionable that the 
Community method does not end there as beyond the Commission’s initiative, one could 
refer to the comitology phenomenon,30 the role of Coreper, contributions from the 
                                                          
22 ibid 50. 
23 Renaud Dehousse and Paul Magnette, ‘Institutional Change in the EU’, in John Peterson and Michael 
Shackleton (eds) The Institutions of the European Union (OUP 2006) 20-32. 
24 Case 294/83, Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament  [1986] E.C.R. 1339. 
25 Jean-Paul Jacqué, ‘Les Verts v The European Parliament’, in Miguel Poiares Maduro and Loic Azoulai (eds) 
The Past and Future of  EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart 
Publishing 2010) 316-323. In particular, on p 323, he argues: ‘But one must recognise that the Court brought 
about a revolution, not only in granting Parliament capacity to be sued and, thus, opening the way to granting 
it standing to sue and then to the recognition in the Treaties of a status for Parliament equivalent to that of 
the Council and the Commission’. For further arguments on the ‘transformation’ of the Community method 
see Dehousse (n 19) 201-203. 
26 See Paolo Ponzano and others, The Power of Initiative of the European Commission: A Progressive Erosion? 
(Notre Europe 2012); Uwe Puetter, ‘Europe's Deliberative Intergovernmentalism: The Role of the Council and 
European Council in EU Economic Governance’ (2012) 19 J Eur Public Policy 162. 
27 Liesbet Hooghe and Neill Nugent, ‘The Commission’s Services’ in John Peterson and Michael Shackleton 
(eds) The Institutions of the European Union (OUP 2006) 152. 
28 Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan 2006) 163-171 and 
395-404. 
29 ibid. 
30 Christian Joerges and Jürgen Neyer, ‘From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political 
Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology’  (1997) 3 ELJ 273-299. 
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Committee of the Regions or the Economic and Social Committee, and so on. The above 
exceed the objectives of this contribution. 
On the post-Lisbon status of the method, one observes that the Treaty strengthens the 
Community method stricto sensu by abolishing the pre-existing three pillars, by renaming 
the co-decision legislative procedure to ‘ordinary legislative procedure’31 and by extending 
its application significantly. This signalises the strengthening of the European Parliament, 
but not automatically a critical augmentation in democratic terms; as Weiler put it, 
legitimizing the process by relying on co-decision only ignores that the procedure is still 
under the control of the Council, which is the ‘ultimate legislator’.32 Concerning the 
subsequent extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council, different views 
have been expressed. Majone accentuates the delays in decision-making whenever QMV is 
used to the expense of unanimity,33 whilst Bribosia finds that after Lisbon, ‘the Community 
method has not only been reasserted, but also reinforced’.34 For present purposes, the 
differences are not substantial as Majone argues that the Community method should be 
even more efficient, and Bribosia that the status quo (an efficiency-oriented method) has 
been expanded ratione materiae. 
 
To resume this discussion, the following thoughts might be of relevance; whereas the claims 
for the significance of the production of outcomes in a supranational multilevel polity retain 
their validity, the author subscribes to views suggesting that the EU should seriously 
consider, if not prioritize, input mechanisms as well,35 not least since there might occur 
times when the EU might not be able to ‘deliver’ according to citizens’ preferences, thereby 
instantly bringing to surface the perennial issue of its insufficient democratic legitimacy.  
 
The ECI presented an excellent opportunity to depart from the prioritization of 
considerations on the effectiveness of the method, as previously described, towards a more 
democratically legitimized Community method through the direct participation of citizens 
in the process. Given that the Lisbon Treaty left many aspects of the ECI unsettled, it 
would fall upon the Regulation – on the basis of Article 24 TFEU    to essentially determine 
the ECI’s direction. That being said, we may now focus on the legal framework of the ECI. 
 
3. THE ECI’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK: TREATY OF LISBON, THE COMMISSION’S 
GREEN PAPER AND REGULATION 211/2011  
 
As an introductory remark, it should be noted that along with referenda, initiatives are 
considered as the modern applications of direct democracy. Why is direct participation 
critical? As Dahl maintains, the ‘fundamental democratic dilemma’ of a polity is whether it 
                                                          
31 Art 294 TFEU. 
32 JHH Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor? And Other Essays on European 
Integration (CUP 1999) 38. 
33 Majone (n 12) 56-59. 
34 Hervé Bribosia, ‘The Main Institutional Innovations in the Lisbon Treaty’, in Stefan Griller and Jacques 
Ziller (eds) The Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism Without a Constitutional Treaty? (Springer 2008) 78. This 
seems to be the view of the Commission as well, which had stated that ‘[w]ith regard to effectiveness, the scope of 
majority decision-making needs to be extended’. See Commission (n 7) 7 (emphasis in the original). 
35 Consider for instance Richard Bellamy, ‘Democracy Without Democracy? Can the EU's Democratic 
“Outputs” be Separated from the Democratic “Inputs” Provided by Competitive Parties and Majority Rule?’ 
(2010) 17 J Eur Public Policy 2-19; Christopher Lord, A Democratic Audit of the European Union (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2004); Dimitris Chryssochoou, Democracy in the European Union (Tauris 2000); Óscar García 
Agustín, ‘Transnational Deliberative Democracy in the Context of the European Union: The 
Institutionalisation of the European Integration Forum’ (2012) 16 Eur Integration Online Papers 
<eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2012-010a.htm> accessed 11 January 2013. 
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will sacrifice its size for participation, or inversely, whether it will grow and operate as a 
‘large-scale unit’ leaving policy-making and decision-making to representatives and 
experts.36 In this respect, it appears that the abovementioned tools of direct democracy are 
well suited to cover the shortcomings of representative democracy, whenever they occur.37 
 
In the European Union, with the well known and discussed characteristics of diversity and 
pluralism, the ECI figured among the provisions of the ‘Constitutional’ Treaty, but despite 
(or because of) the disappointment by the two negative referenda, it still features in Lisbon. 
Indeed, it is now part of the provisions on democratic principles of the EU (Title II TEU). 
Article 11.4 TEU states: 
 
Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member 
States may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the framework of 
its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a 
legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.  
 
Furthermore, in Article 24 TFEU, one reads that the ECI forms part of the European 
citizenship, but residency in the EU is not adequate; the signatories must be member state 
nationals, therefore (as Article 20 TFEU verifies) EU citizens. However, Dougan’s excellent 
analysis of the legal and potentially constitutional implications of the ECI questions the 
exclusion of third country nationals and rightly points out that, after all, the right to 
petition the European Parliament is open to everyone.38  
 
On November 11th, 2009, the Commission published a Green Paper on the citizens’ 
initiative,39 which broadly outlined its views. The citizens’ initiative (as a draft legislative 
Resolution) was voted by an emphatic majority by the European Parliament, receiving 628 
out of 667 votes (94.2%),40 demonstrating the European  Parliament’s will to support this 
new tool of political participation. On 16th February 2011, the European Parliament and the 
Council adopted the Regulation 211/2011, the legally binding version of the ECI, relying 
considerably on the Commission’s Green Paper. In what follows, I examine in parallel the 
views of the Commission and the final provisions of the Regulation. 
 
In the introduction of the Green Paper, the Commission set out its expected outcomes, 
while recognizing the absence of a European public sphere: 
 
It will add a new dimension to European democracy, complement the set of rights related to 
the citizenship of the Union and increase the public debate around European politics, 
helping to bring a genuine European public space. Its implementation will reinforce citizens’ 
and organized civil society’s involvement in the shaping of EU policies.41  
 
Furthermore, the preamble of Regulation 211/2011 states that the initiative should be 
‘clear, simple, user-friendly [...] so as to encourage participation by citizens and to make the 
                                                          
36 Robert A Dahl, On Democracy (Yale UP 2000) 100-118. 
37 For a strong defence of this point see David Altman, ‘Bringing direct democracy back in: toward a three-
dimensional measure of democracy’ (2012) 19 Democratization 1-27. 
38 Michael Dougan, ‘What are we to make of the Citizens’ Initiative?’ (2011) 48 CMLR 1821-1822. 
39 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Green Paper on European Citizens’ Initiative’, [2009] COM 
622 final (Green Paper). 
40 Votewatch, ‘European Parliament – Citizens’ Initiative’ <www.votewatch.eu/en/citizens-initiative-draft-
legislative-resolution-vote-legislative-resolution-ordinary-legislative-pr.html> accessed 11 January 2013. 
41 Green Paper 3. 
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Union more accessible’.42 Besides, modern technology should be a useful ‘tool of 
participatory democracy’, whereas data protection is a high priority.43 
The Green Paper recognized a few priorities regarding consultation. First, what should be 
the minimum number of member states? Examining the various options, the Commission’s 
view was that the two opposite choices would be to either require a majority of member 
states or one quarter of them.44 According to the Commission, the two pivotal explanations 
of the use of the phrase ‘significant number of member states’ in the Treaty were that the 
initiative should be, on the one hand, ‘sufficiently representative of a Union interest’ and on 
the other hand, a flexible mechanism which could actually work in practice. The 
Commission concluded that the balanced choice would be one third of member states. The 
Regulation slightly departs from this view, since it was finally decided that the minimum 
number of member states should be one quarter.45 For now, this number is 7. 
 
Further in the Green Paper, the Commission endorsed the viewpoint that the collection of 
signatures must be somehow proportional across member states, thus fixing additional 
minimums there; besides, this was in accordance with the ‘spirit of the Treaties’ and it 
would indeed reflect that the proposed legislation would represent a ‘reasonable body of 
opinion’ in each member state.46 Instead of fixing a specific minimum number across 
member states, the Commission observed that the proportional option would be 0.2% of the 
population of each participating member state. The reason was that out of 500 million 
citizens (the population of the Union) 1 million is needed, which is 0.2%.47 The Regulation 
somehow slightly departs from this position, stating that the minimum signatories per 
member state should be calculated in accordance with the number of MEPs multiplied by 
750.48 Thus, Annex I of Regulation confirms that countries electing, for instance, 22 MEPs 
(Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary and Portugal) will have to certify that at least 
16,500 of their nationals support the initiative.  
 
A link with the European elections may also be identified as regards minimum age 
requirements for citizens. It was therefore proposed by the Commission to refer to the 
voting age for the elections for the European Parliament in each member state, which is 16 
in Austria and 18 in the remaining states.49 The proposal was eventually followed.50  
 
The Regulation stresses the role of organisers, who are ‘natural persons forming a citizens’ 
committee responsible for the preparation of a citizens’ initiative and its submission to the 
Commission’,51 including the responsibility of registering the initiative and collecting the 
signatures. Article 3 contains further prerequisites: EU citizenship is required (therefore a 
non-EU citizen cannot organize a campaign), while the members of the committee must be 
‘at least seven persons who are residents of at least seven different Member States’ and they 
                                                          
42 Recital n 2 of Regulation. 
43 See Recitals n 14 and 21 of Regulation, respectively. 
44 Green Paper 4. 
45 Art 7.1 of Regulation. See also Recital n 5 of Regulation, where the rationale provided by the Commission is 
reproduced, without further justifications, ‘In order to ensure that a citizens’ initiative is representative of a 
Union interest, while ensuring that the instrument remains easy to use, that number should be set at one 
quarter of Member States’. 
46 Green Paper 5. 
47 Ibid. This was the view of the European Parliament as well. See Resolution (n 3). 
48 Article 7.2 of Regulation. 
49 Green Paper 6. 
50 Art 3.4 and Recital 7 of Regulation. The same age requirements apply to the organisers of the initiative (see 
below n 51). 
51 Art 2.3 of Regulation. 
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should select ‘contact persons’ to connect with the institutions. Members of the European 
Parliament are excluded. 
 
Another interesting point is to determine whether the submission of the initiative must have 
a certain legal form, eg a draft law, or whether it is sufficient to demonstrate clearly in the 
text the ‘subject-matter and objectives of the proposal’, leaving the further translation into a 
legal document to the Commission. Indeed, the Commission endorsed the second option52 
and so does the Regulation. The submission of a ‘draft legal act’ is optional.53  
 
An online register will be maintained by the Commission in order to accommodate the 
registration of the initiatives.54 The registration should be followed by a title, the subject 
matter, the objectives and the pertinent Treaty provisions that enable the Commission to 
act, the details of the organisers, and the exact sources of funding, all of which serve the 
overall transparency of the process.55 The Commission will provide the organisers with a 
registration number within two months, after having performed a very critical control in 
terms of its content.56 This control should work as a counter-balance to the initiative being 
used for populist purposes or manipulation. More specifically, it has to be verified that the 
proposal ‘does not manifestly fall outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to 
submit a proposal for a legal act’.57 The term ‘manifestly’ points to the discretionary powers 
of the Commission, and also leaves the door open for a second, ex post control, once the 
signatures have been collected. In addition, the initiative should not be ‘manifestly abusive, 
frivolous or vexatious’58 and should be in accordance with the values of the Union of Article 
2 TEU, such as human dignity, the rule of law, fundamental rights and democracy.59 In the 
case of a negative response, the Commission should provide thorough explanations, notably 
by identifying which of the abovementioned conditions were not met, and it should inform 
the organisers of any available means of action, notably Court remedies or the possibility of 
contacting the European Ombudsman.60 Once registered, the initiative will become publicly 
accessible, in accordance with the principle of transparency.61 Transparency is also 
guaranteed via the absence of central EU funding, which will ensure the ‘independence and 
citizen-driven nature of initiatives’.62 
 
In relation to time limits, the Commission observed that the deadline should be ‘reasonable 
and sufficiently long so as to allow a campaign’.63 The Regulation states that the organisers 
benefit from a 12-month period to collect the signatures.64 The time limit can be 
characterized as fair and reasonable. The collection of signatures may be achieved via the 
completion of detailed forms indicating full name, residence, place of birth, nationality, 
date/signature and for some countries, a personal identification number.65 An additional 
form should be completed by the organisers, along with the signatories’ form. Furthermore, 
                                                          
52 Green Paper 7. 
53 Annex II of Regulation. 
54 Art 4 of Regulation. 
55 Annex II of Regulation. 
56 The Regulation reflects here the Resolution of the European Parliament. 
57 Art 4.2 (b) of Regulation. 
58 Art 4.2 (c) of Regulation. 
59 Art 4.2 (d) of Regulation. 
60 Art 4.3 of Regulation. 
61 Art 4.4 of Regulation. 
62 Green Paper 10. 
63 ibid. 
64 Art 5.5 of Regulation. 
65 Annex III of Regulation. 
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if one opts for the online collection of signatures (incontestably a positive development), one 
should obtain a specific certificate for this, ensuring that the collection complies with 
Regulation 211/2011.66 The Regulation applies from April 1st, 2012, whereas pursuant to 
its Article 15 the Commission has now uploaded on its website a list of competent national 
authorities to certify the statements of support and another list for the online collection 
system.67 In typical bureaucratic fashion, the authorities will have to issue another 
certificate concerning the number of valid signatures in a maximum period of 3 months,68 
which should be afterwards forwarded to the Commission by the organisers, along with the 
forms concerning the content of the initiative.69 Upon the receipt of the proposal, the 
Commission must publish it, meet with the organisers so as the key elements of the proposal 
be explained and finally, publish within 3 months a communication concerning the 
Commission’s ‘legal and political conclusions’.70 Note that in the Green Paper, the 
Commission had pointed out that its role consists of an evaluation of the ECI before 
deciding ‘whether the substance of the initiative merits further action from its side’, 
followed by conclusions which should take the form of a communication, in a fixed deadline, 
according to the principles of good administration.71 A public hearing at the European 
Parliament72 will provide the organisers with the opportunity for further attention. This 
appears to be the only instance where the European Parliament engages in the process.73 
 
4. EVALUATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK: A SYMBOLIC 
INTRODUCTION WHICH CANNOT INCREASE THE DEMOCRATIC 
LEGITIMACY OF THE COMMUNITY METHOD 
 
Before assessing the potential impact of the ECI on the Community method, it is useful to 
recall the threshold of this paper. The ECI, due to its nature, should affect decision-making 
and, more specifically, the Community method, the latter being output-oriented. Only an 
impact on decision-making will increase the democratic legitimacy of the Union, which 
needs to be looked at in the Commission’s own words,74 besides the numerous scholarly 
accounts. It is not suggested that the ECI should amount to a national instrument of direct 
democracy without counter-majoritarian adaptations, but it should at least affect decision-
making.  
 
As previously demonstrated, the ECI could affect the Community method via two avenues. 
It could either decisively influence the Commission’s agenda-setting monopoly (or, should 
we choose to place the threshold lower, it could at least affect the Community method lato 
sensu) or it could facilitate the involvement of European citizens by refraining from imposing 
burdensome, unnecessary formalities, thereby adding to the overall improvement of the 
democratic character of the EU process of decision-making. 
 
The title of this section has already set the tone, but it is opportune to refer in the first place 
to some provisions of the Regulation that point in the right direction: the control before the 
                                                          
66 Art 6 of Regulation. 
67 <ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/implementation-national-level?lg=en> accessed 11 January 2013. 
68 Art 8.2 of Regulation. 
69 Art 9 of Regulation. 
70 Art 10 of Regulation. 
71 Green Paper 12-13. 
72 Art 11 of Regulation. 
73 Exclusive of the obligation of the Commission to submit a Report to the European Parliament every three 
years on the application of the Regulation. See Art 22 of Regulation. 
74  See above n 7 
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collection of signatures ensures that the values of the Union but also the Commission’s 
competences are respected; the minimum number in each member state depends on the 
number of MEPs; the collection of signatures accurately does not exceed the time-limit of 
12 months; from a democratic legitimacy perspective in particular, the wide application of 
the principle of transparency at all the levels of the process and the possibility for the online 
collection of signatures    certainly a faster mechanism    add some limited elements of 
democratic legitimisation to the broader picture of decision-making in the EU. 
 
In what follows, the criticism will focus on two main issues, namely the possibility of the 
Commission to set aside one million signatures and the widespread existence of formalities. 
The simultaneous presence of both, it is argued, undermines the potential of the ECI in 
relation to the abovementioned threshold. 
 
4.1 The Intactness of the Commission’s Agenda Setting Monopoly 
 
I will subscribe from the start to the viewpoint that the ECI, as presented in the Lisbon 
Treaty and more importantly in Regulation 211/2011, is first and foremost a mechanism of 
transnational participatory, rather than direct democracy.75 Indeed, the European model of 
the citizens’ initiative is a ‘non-binding agenda-setting’ version76 differing from most of 
member states’ analogous mechanisms, where citizens can forward the proposal directly to 
the legislative chamber, an option which is not possible at the European level due to the 
presence of the Commission.77 According to one view, the European initiative is not a 
proper ‘popular legislative initiative’ for the above reasons – the EU policymakers do not 
trust their citizens ‘to initiate the decision-making process’   being in the risk to be classified 
as a more sophisticated right to petition the European Parliament.78 The European 
Parliament had highlighted this danger, citizens must identify the differences between the 
two instruments and the eventual Regulation should point to that direction.79  
 
Subsequently, it appears incontestable that the major institution that will deal with the ECI 
has been decided to be the European Commission; in other words, the success of the story 
has been entrusted to the Commission. The Commission will issue reports every three 
years, and further to Article 290 TFEU, it may amend the Annexes of the Regulation using 
delegated acts,80 leaving a right to revocation or objection to the European Parliament and 
the Council,81 as a counter-balance to the Commission’s powers. One might wonder why the 
Commission would need to be the responsible EU institution for the ECI, given the 
Commission’s perception among citizens as a technocracy that cannot reach the European 
citizens. The European Parliament could be a valid alternative. The overwhelming voting 
percentage at the European Parliament (94.2%) is perhaps another indication that the 
                                                          
75 See Miguel Sousa Ferro, ‘Popular Legislative Initiative in the EU: Alea Iacta Est’  (2007) 26 YB Eur L 355 - 
385 and in particular a comprehensive table on p 360; see also Janice Thomson, ‘“A Space inside Europe for the 
Public” before “A European Public  Space”: The European Citizens’ [2011] Initiative and the Future of EU 
Public  Engagement, online: <www.involve.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/ECI-A-Space-Inside-
Europe-for-the-Public.pdf> accessed 11 January 2013; Paolo Ponzano, ‘A Million Citizens can Request 
European Legislation: A Sui Generis Right of Initiative’ [2011]: <blogs.eui.eu/eudo-cafe/a-million-citizens-
can-request-european-legislation-a-sui-generis-right-of-initiative.html> accessed 11 January 2013; Dougan (n 
38), 1807 and 1834. 
76 Thomson (n 75) 3. 
77 Ponzano (n 75). 
78 Sousa Ferro (n 75) 360 and 376. 
79 Resolution (n 3). 
80 Art 16 of Regulation. 
81 Arts 18 and 19 of Regulation, respectively. 
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European Parliament was enthusiastic to make efforts so as to boost the possibilities of this 
new instrument. Furthermore, given the limited participation in European elections, the 
active involvement of the European Parliament in the initiative could be a good opportunity 
to re-connect with citizens. 
 
Furthermore, and related to the above, it appears that the Commission has complete 
discretionary powers in relation to the handling of the initiative, its only obligation being to 
justify and explain the possible absence of action (or inversely the action), ‘the Commission 
should explain in a clear, comprehensible and detailed manner the reasons for its intended 
action, and should likewise give its reasons if it does not intend to take any action’.82 From a 
direct-democratic perspective, this is an obvious shortcoming. While the first scanning in 
relation to the admissibility, before the collection of signatures is totally understood, the 
eventual rejection of the initiative on the basis of merits will leave citizens, EU democracy 
supporters and civil society organizations largely disappointed. Accordingly, the first level 
of scrutiny (ex ante approval in procedural and substantial terms) should ensure that even if 
citizens ask for anything, or act further to populist manipulation, that proposal will not be 
forwarded. Imagine, for example, a campaign against fundamental rights or an action which 
falls outside the scope of the EU competences as described now in Title I of the TFEU. 
However, upon the collection and verification of signatures, the Commission should have 
been obliged to start the respective legislative procedure and subsequently accept the 
replacement of its monopoly, a scenario which would indeed affect the initiative part of the 
Community method. One should not forget that even under this scenario, there would still 
be room for deliberation in the Council and the European Parliament. In order to become 
EU law, the proposal would still have to pass by the two Institutions, which further ensures 
a final round of scrutiny,83 however not performed by the Commission. 
 
Laurent argues that the Commission needs to act with ‘prudence’ and to apply the standards 
of ‘sincere cooperation’, in order to avoid a perception of the instrument as a ‘democratic 
illusion’, from the citizens’ perspective.84 
 
Thus, the European Parliament’s reference to the ECI as ‘a means of exercising public 
sovereign power in the area of legislation’85 was not followed by far. It is striking that none 
of the abovementioned documents (Regulation 211/2011, but especially the Commission’s 
Green Paper, or even the Resolution of the European Parliament)86 make any 
recommendation or provide insight as to how the Commission should use its discretionary 
powers in relation to the final decision on the initiative. This could perhaps be regarded as a 
manifestation of the willingness of all institutions to leave the Community method 
‘undamaged’. On the question whether, from a legal perspective, it could (or should) be 
otherwise, divergent lines of argumentation may be identified. Ponzano answers in the 
negative, stressing the ‘particularities of the European Union’s institutional system’, and 
                                                          
82 Recital n 20 of Regulation. 
83 If the act indeed falls under the scope of the ordinary legislative procedure. 
84 Sylvain Laurent, ‘Le droit d’initiative citoyenne : en attendant  l’entrée en vigueur de la Constitution 
européenne’ (2006) 497 Revue du Marché Commun et de l’Union Européenne 225 (author’s translation). 
85 Resolution. 
86 One could add here the contribution of the European Ombudsman to the Commission’s Public Consultation, 
where in brief he argued that he is willing to supervise the Commission’s stance towards the admissibility 
stage of the initiative, which is a purely legal issue, contrary to the final assessment which is a political matter 
and should be dealt with by the European Parliament. See European Ombudsman ‘Contribution to the Public 
Consultation on the European Citizens’ Initiative’: 
<www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/resources/otherdocument.faces/en/4592/html.bookmark> accessed 11
January 2013. 
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inviting us not to underestimate that the citizens have been granted a right equivalent to 
the right both the European Parliament and the Council enjoy.87 Dougan argues that ‘it 
always seemed doubtful that [the ECI’s Regulation] could lawfully have been used to go 
much further’ without ‘infring[ing] the Commision’s institutional prerogative of legislative 
initiative’.88 Sousa Ferro in his sceptical account accentuates the policy-oriented issues that 
occurred during the Constitutional Convention, namely the undesirability of introducing a 
popular legislative initiative without extending accordingly the right of the European 
Parliament.89 That being said, and regardless of a definitive answer to this interesting 
question, one observes that, in the context of a de facto ‘progressive erosion’ of the 
Commission’s legislative monopoly discussed above, which is widely perceived as a natural 
evolution of the method, it would need to fall upon the ECI to stick to the formal 
observation of the Commission’s prerogative. 
 
Besides, the whole round of policy-preparation (or, the Community method lato sensu) can 
difficultly be affected. The Commission has practically 18 months after the registration (12 
months for the collection, 3 months for the verification and another 3 months after the 
submission and until the communication) to form its final position, which is sufficient time 
to seek for the abovementioned well-established consultation practices. Upon the 
submission, there is a time limit of only 3 months, but we can estimate that the Commission 
might already possess the necessary information to assess the potential of the initiative well 
in advance of the deadline of 12 months. Also, the public hearing of Article 11 before the 
European Parliament could be seen as an additional source of networking. What is more, 
the Commission may decide to reject the proposal even by suggesting that this preparatory 
phase is incomplete and that it needs more time to decide on the substance; according to the 
spirit of the Regulation, it appears that a well justified/explained conclusion of this kind 
would be totally acceptable (of course the danger of maladministration is always present for 
the Commission). 
  
4.2 The Burdensome Formalities Imposed upon Citizens and Organisers 
 
Let us now turn to the second leg of our examination, namely an assessment on the 
thresholds of the citizens’ initiative. It was previously argued that the ECI could perhaps 
provide an alternative to the current system of decision-making, had it not been designed as 
a mechanism where unnecessary formalities would have been imposed. In this context, I 
subscribe to the concerns of civil society,90 adding that the instrument is in the danger of 
becoming quite impractical to use. A synoptic presentation of the prerequisites is worth 
mentioning: a minimum number of member states; a minimum number of signatories per 
member state; requirements for the citizens’ committee; the registration/registration 
number; the receipt of a certificate for the online collection; the receipt of a certificate 
verifying the statements of support; the completion of detailed forms; and of course, the 
clarification of the authorities of member states in the first place. On the one hand, it is 
understood that the EU officials wish to verify the validity of the signatures and the levels 
of actual support across member states. On the other hand, the overall process does not 
sound user-friendly and appealing. One would expect more simplified procedures for a new 
tool promising to boost political participation. 
 
                                                          
87 Ponzano (n 75). 
88 Dougan (n 38) 1842.  
89 Sousa Ferro (n 75) 375. 
90 <www.act4europe.org/code/en/policy.asp?Page=267&menuPage=214> accessed 11 January 2013. 
 VOLUME 6 EJLS    ISSUE 1 
 
104 
 
More in detail, the choice of the minimum number of member states was based on an 
incomplete analysis which in any case did not consider the present obstacles for political 
participation at the EU level. The Regulation merely declares that one quarter of member 
states ensures simultaneously representativeness and flexibility.91 The Commission’s 
position, expressed in the Green paper (one third of member states), was based on references 
to rather irrelevant articles of the Lisbon Treaty,92 or experiences from one EU (Austria) 
and one non-EU (Switzerland) country. However, derogations from this rule could have 
been provisioned, with a view to enhancing the chances of appropriate endorsement and 
therefore citizens’ involvement. For instance, in areas of regional interest (eg an 
environmental issue in Scandinavia or in the Adriatic Sea), since it might be difficult to 
launch a pan-European action, an initiative from the nationals of the member states directly 
concerned could have been provisioned. In fact, this argument could indeed stem from the 
abovementioned Protocol on subsidiarity, given that Article 2 states that, ‘[b]efore 
proposing legislative acts, the Commission shall consult widely. Such consultations shall, 
where appropriate, take into account the regional and local dimension of the action 
envisaged’. 
 
In addition, as previously explained, the responsibility to verify the authenticity of each 
signature shall remain with the member states, for their respective citizens. However, the 
Commission was preoccupied to impose certain panuropean administrative provisions in the 
first place, as a choice between ‘full harmonisation of procedural requirements’ and member-
state flexibility, because this ‘approach could preserve the European-wide nature of the 
citizens’ initiative’.93 One might be somewhat sceptical as to whether, by preventing 
member states from utilizing flexible mechanisms, the Commission indeed struck the right 
balance there. 
 
What is more, the capability of the organisers to withdraw the initiative after the 
registration, but before its submission94 is partly problematic as well, giving the impression 
that the proposal ‘belongs’ to the organisers, instead of citizens, although it was the 
European Parliament that suggested this provision. A more justifiable option would be to 
leave the process open after the registration. One cannot entirely preclude this scenario as 
once the initiative is published, on highly sensitive issues, the organisers could be subject to 
diverse political pressures. Nonetheless, their eventual decision to withdraw cannot prevail 
over the voice of thousands of citizens. Accordingly, as Dougan asserts, the organizational 
prerequisites imposed by the Regulation render ‘the prospect of NGOs monopolizing 
whatever agenda-setting influence might be squeezed from the new [E]CI a real one’.95 
Inversely, the European Parliament had proposed that any statement of support could be 
withdrawn before the expiration of the period of 12 months.  
 
In a broader context, it has been supported that ‘modern citizens are, on the whole, better 
educated’, demand direct involvement and there is evidence of this ‘in declining voter 
participation and collapsing political party membership’.96 They have enormous access to 
information and they prioritize accountability; for instance, the Indignados exercised 
                                                          
91 Recital n 5 of Regulation. 
92 The ‘enhanced cooperation’ mechanism and the involvement of national parliaments in the observance of the 
subsidiarity principle, as defined in Art. 7.2 of the Protocol (No 2) on the Application of the Principles of 
Subsidiarity and Proportionality of the Lisbon Treaty. 
93 Green Paper 7-9. 
94 Art 4.5 of Regulation. 
95 Dougan (n 38), 1833. 
96 Thomson (n 75). 
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considerable pressure in Spain, Greece and elsewhere. Generally, an evolution worth 
noticing is, according to della Porta, the emergence of European movements and various 
forms of activism, which do not question the European polity as such, but rather the quality 
of decision-making.97 Applying these thoughts to Regulation 211/2011, it is arguably 
unpromising that the final framework of the ECI overlooked the possibilities for a more 
direct involvement. 
 
To put it differently, one could understand either a less formal/more flexible process and 
the Commission’s initiative monopoly remaining unaffected, or a strict procedure with 
various levels of scrutiny, but the eventual outcome being the submission of the proposal by 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council.98 But the inclusion of both 
thresholds gives us grounds to assume that for the EU policymakers and despite the rather 
generous promises, the citizens’ involvement in decision-making is still not a priority. 
Eventually, one can still hope that one million signatures of seven member states under 
such formalities are a heavy political input and it would be really surprising to see the 
Commission finally rejecting the initiative (see more on this point below). What the 
Commission could opt for, though, would be to retain the principal idea    the rationale    of 
the proposal and amend some specific (or crucial) details. In any case, only the Commission’s 
actual policy on this matter will tell. What we do know, nonetheless, is that the legal 
framework, which is under evaluation in this contribution, leaves in principle ample room 
for discretion to the European Commission. 
 
4.3 Some Thoughts on the ECI as an Addition to Existing ‘Structures for 
Participation’ 
 
Finally, I shall briefly refer to a few more optimistic accounts on what appears at first sight 
a different in nature, yet equally important, path of assessment; the possibilities for 
deliberative/participatory democracy, inclusive of an active civil society dialogue on EU 
matters and/or ‘the Europeanisation of national public discourses’.99 One preliminary 
enquiry arises as follows: if the purpose was to add another opportunity for participation, 
why the ECI had to be entitled an ‘initiative’ and not, for instance, a Forum for EU-wide 
consultation? This would lower expectations for legitimisation, since the word ‘initiative’ 
inevitably points to a certain impact on legislation. Currently, as observed by at least two 
accounts,100 a petition to the European Parliament is more user-friendly and inclusive 
ratione personae than the ECI, while essentially amounting, from a legal perspective, to the 
same result.  
 
Putting comparisons aside, a vicious cycle might emerge and this points to the formalities of 
the ECI in how to foster a European public sphere (an EU-wide mobilisation) without a pre-
existent civic demos and public sphere? The online collection of signatures appears as the 
way forward, with any consequences for citizens still not familiar with new media.101 The 
                                                          
97 Donatella della Porta, ‘The Emergence of European Movements? Civil Society and  the EU’ (2008) 3 
EJLS 1-37. 
98 Assuming that the act falls under the ordinary legislative procedure, which is a very likely scenario. 
99 See CEPS and others, The Treaty of Lisbon: A Second Look at the Institutional Innovations (Brussels, 2010) 131, 
online:  <www.ceps.eu/book/treaty-lisbon-second-look-institutional-innovations> accessed 11 January 2013; 
recently Elizabeth Monaghan, ‘Assessing Participation and Democracy in the EU: The Case of the European 
Citizens’ Initiative’ (2012) 13 Perspectives on Eur Politics and Society 285-298. 
100 Soussa Ferro (n 75); Dougan (n 38). 
101 See a recently published paper on this topic by Sephane Carrara, ‘Towards e-ECIs? European Participation 
by Online Pan-European Mobilization’ (2012) 13 Perspectives on Eur Politics and Society 352-369. 
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Commission should be credited for temporarily providing its servers for organisers, in order 
to facilitate the online collection of signatures.102  
 
However, one could still argue that despite the possibilities for a significant EU-wide 
communicative interaction and dialogue that are indeed opening up (albeit in an 
unnecessarily formalistic context), any prospects for input legitimacy would be instantly 
undermined by a decision of the Commission to reject the proposal after the collection of 
signatures. This inevitably brings us back to the main argument of this contribution, 
namely to the normative claim on the ECI’s link with the Community method and the effect 
on decision-making. Thus, since the instrument is legislative in nature, and since the 
formalities imposed by Regulation 211/2011 cannot be overcome now, the only viable 
option appears – again    to be the Commission setting aside de facto its discretion on 
legislative monopoly to the benefit of one million citizens or more. One should acknowledge 
that it is not an easy policy choice, but it is admittedly a choice that would increase the 
Commission’s own legitimacy as well. For that to happen, it would merely suffice that the 
messages on the ECI website be followed, the ECI ‘allows one million EU citizens to 
participate directly in the development of EU policies’ – ‘You can set the agenda!’.103 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Any assessment arguably depends on the threshold one will employ, and this applies to this 
contribution as well. If one chooses to evaluate the ECI as an addition to existing 
opportunity structures for participation, one might share the optimism occasionally 
expressed, though one might still need to identify what more the ECI has to offer (apart 
from a complicated procedure) when compared with the right to petition the European 
Parliament (even in that case, it has been shown why the setting aside of the Commission’s 
legislative monopoly is necessary for legitimisation purposes).  
 
On the contrary, this paper focused on the purpose of the ECI, in other words decision-
making and legislation, where the post-Lisbon Community method remains preponderant. 
It was found that the ECI’s legislative framework, unsurprisingly, creates an instrument far 
from the field of direct democracy, in a context where the Community method remains 
widely unaffected. More in detail, it was demonstrated that it is rather unlikely for the ECI 
to ‘threaten’ the Community method stricto sensu, by affecting the Commission’s agenda-
setting monopoly or the range of discretion of the Commission and increasingly of other 
institutional actors concerning the preparatory phase of decision-making (lato sensu); 
simultaneously, from a broader perspective, that it is unlikely to mark a turn to input-
oriented mechanisms at the EU level due to various (but frequently unjustified) formalities. 
 
Despite the aforementioned unfavourable legal framework, the EU practice (and I am 
referring primarily to the Commission, because the formalities imposed by Regulation 211 
cannot be amended at this stage) could contribute towards a more prosperous future for the 
initiative, therefore towards a more identifiable influence on the Community method. Such 
optimistic scenario should include the extensive and successful use of the tool by European 
                                                          
102<ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/sefcovic/headlines/press-
releases/2012/07/2012_07_18_eci_en.htm> accessed 11 January 2013. 
103 <ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/welcome>, accessed 11 January 2013. The word ‘directly’ 
emphasized by the author, otherwise emphasis in the original. 
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citizens104 and possibly a positive contribution by the CJEU. The Court, if asked to review a 
decision of the Commission to reject or amend the proposal, could base its reasoning – 
beyond the proportionality test    on the presence of the ECI in the articles concerning the 
EU citizenship, or it could refer to the principles of openness and proximity to citizens105 
and the provisions on participation, especially the ‘right to participate in the democratic life 
of the Union’.106 Otherwise, the risk of a symbolic introduction with limited input is visible. 
                                                          
104 It is interesting to note that in 2010 and almost one year after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, but 
before the adoption of the Regulation, some environmental NGOs submitted an ‘initiative’ on the ban of 
genetically modified organisms in the EU to the Commission, having managed to collect one million 
signatures. After an initial hesitation to accept the petition, the Commission eventually decided to consider it, 
while underlining that the formal mechanism had not been set up at that time. See generally: 
<euobserver.com/institutional/31388>; <www.euractiv.com/cap/citizens-initiative-call-gm-crop-news-
498524>; <euobserver.com/environment/31474> all accessed 2 February 2013. 
105 Art 1 TEU. 
106 Art 10.3 TEU. Dougan expresses concerns on whether such a stance from the Court is legally permissible, 
given the Commission’s monopoly on legislation, but he anticipates a contribution from the Court at the first 
stage, namely the Commission’s decision on whether or not to register the initiative, thus ‘open[ing] up a 
whole new avenue for constitutional adjudication concerning some important grey zones in EU law’: Dougan 
(n 38) 1843 and 1848. One should add potential contributions from the European Ombudsman as well, who is 
both competent (Art 4.3 of Regulation) and determined (see above n 86) to supervise the Commission’s stance
towards the admissibility stage of the ECI. 
